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The emergence of 212 and 414 Islamic movements (popularly known 
as aksi bela Islam) in 2016 triggered discussions among scholars. Vari-
ous academic arguments and speculations have sprung up to respond 
and understand the phenomenon of raising Islamic agenda on public 
stage. One of the oldest journals in Indonesia, Prisma, is clearly critical 
to this by labelling the maneuver as populist threat to democracy. The 
title of “The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Democracy” in one of 
their publications is a clear indication of its interpretation toward the 
usage of popular narration to attract public interest. It is the Islamic 
narrative that makes the discussion of populism gets more attention 
among scholars as it has powerful message toward the Muslims and in 
the end is able to mobilize support from various Islamic groups. There-
fore, Islamic populism has become a term to label the rise of Islamic 
discourse among the public in Indonesia. 
Surely Islam is not new at the center of the study of populism. Ira-
nian Revolution under Khomeini is an important step of this study. 
Saad Edin Ebrahim is one of the known scholars to label populism in 
this revolution by coining Islam and populism. Many have followed 
his approach by looking at the power of religious jargon either to at-
tract public support or in the opposite, to suppress the mass. However, 
Islamic narrative is not only working on revolutionary platform as many 
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are failed to materialize the call to act for God at any costs or means. 
In fact, democracy has become an arena for the call, instead of revolu-
tion or violence. Turkey is one of the examples that democracy can be 
used for a popular Muslim leader to step the ladder into power. Many 
writers from different backgrounds have tried to understand this new 
face of populism and get involved in numerous discussions, all debat-
ing the rise of populism with its so called ‘modernistic face’. In general, 
the writer’s debates come to the conclusion that the rise of populism 
based on religious identity is in the opposite direction of democracy 
and Indonesia’s recent Islamic call in public sphere has been marked as 
the period of democratic crisis (Djani 2017; Hardiman 2017; Jati 2017).
However, there has been a gap that these debates that have been 
overlooked, which is the link between populism and Islamic groups 
which has so far been left untouched. Some scholars have tried to see 
the link between Islam on one side and Populism on the other side 
and the link between the two as a whole. There is a trend that these 
writers see populism in terms of ideology, mobilization, representation, 
while some look at Islamic populism as a political style (Mudhoffir, 
Yasih, & Hakim 2017; Aspinall 2015; Mietzner & Muhtadi 2018; Moffitt 
& Tormey 2014; Aspinall 2015; Mietzner & Muhtadi 2018; Moffitt & 
Tormey 2014; Pepinsky, Liddle, & Mujani 2012). From their arguments, 
it seems that the writers consider the connection between populism 
and Islamic groups as an effort to mobilize the people amid the chaotic 
process of institutionalizing aspirations. Unfortunately, they end their 
discussions at how to respond to Islamic populism in Indonesia, instead 
of questioning further about what kinds of situation that allow Islam 
and populism to co-exist in Indonesia.
A book entitled Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East 
written by Hadiz can be considered as an attempts to fill in the niche. 
Hadiz, with his academic position, seeks to explain the emergence, 
formation and development of Islamic populism in Indonesia. Many 
scholars are convinced that the translated version of the book, trans-
lated by the LP3ES publisher, has become the first and only book that 
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thoroughly discusses the development landscape of Islamic populism 
in Indonesia.
The novelty of the method and the center of discussion has become 
one of the virtues presented in this book. So far, most of the studies of 
Islamic politics in Indonesia use comparative methods by comparing 
Southeast Asian countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (Hadiz 
and Chryssogelos 2017). As a result, Islamic political literature in Indo-
nesia is often associated with the issue of Islamic political separatism. 
Meanwhile, in this occasion the author will invite the readers to see a 
comparison of the development of Islamic politics with Middle Eastern 
countries, such as Turkey and Egypt, that take place in Indonesia.
Furthermore, the author provides a fresh perspective in understand-
ing the development of populism in Indonesia and the Middle East. 
The political-economic approach as a concept will guide the readers 
in understanding the development of Islamic populism with a point of 
study grounding in the search for historical heritage and the upheaval 
of social agents in Indonesia and the Middle East. This perspective is 
very different from ones used by many previous researchers who put 
more emphasis on political studies alone or with a sociological-historical 
approach (Aspinall 2015; Mietzner 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi 2018). 
Consequently, these writers often tend to see only the political-eco-
nomic relations as a part that fundamentally shapes Islamic populism. 
For the context of Indonesia, the evolution and development of Islamic 
populism are tracked by the author by looking at the form of Islamic 
politics, starting from the Colonialism, Cold War, the Old Order, the 
New Order and up to Post-Reformation eras, which all phases are the 
result of a long upheaval from the political-economic clash.
The author comes to the conclusion that in three countries, the 
economic-political evolution varies in different social situations, which 
then has a domino effect on the development of Islamic populism in 
each country. In Indonesia, Islamic populism fails to govern civil so-
ciety and is at the same time mandated in the electoral process, even 
fragmented both by social agents and the political parties. As a result, 
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Islamic Populism can be considered as a failure both inside and outside 
the electoral pathways.
NEO -POPULISM A ND ISL A MIC 
POPULISM IN INDONESI A
Discussions of populism are always identical to the call to “the peo-
ple”. Latin America and Europe are countries that first popularized Pop-
ulism in political dictionaries. One of the scholars who promoted this 
term was Alan Knight. Knight (1998) sees the link between populism 
and people as a whole. Populism often comes to invite people inherently 
(Knight 1998). Then, along with the development of neo-liberalism 
economic that took place in 1997/1998, Populism also experienced 
adjustments. At this stage Knight referred Populism as neo-Populism. 
Furthermore, Knight, saw when entering the era of neo-liberalism in 
the world, neo-populism changed its form into a political style. Knight’s 
belief, in line with Moffitt & Toemey’s opinion (2014), also sees neo-
Populism in Indonesia for the current context is more precisely depicted 
as a political style (Moffitt & Tormey 2014).
On the other hand, Weyland strongly rejects the arguments of 
Knight (1998) and Moffitt & Toemey (2014) about the development 
of neo-populism in the era of neo-liberalism. According to Weyland, 
Knight and Moffitt & Toemey’s arguments seemed to see neo-Popu-
lation as being independent from the basis of economic interests. In 
addition, Knight and Moffitt & Toemey also missed seeing the class 
coalition or what Weyland called as “elite manipulation” that took place 
in neo-Populism. For this reason, Weyland came up with a notion on 
neo-Populism as a result of the upheaval of economic interests, which 
indirectly facilitated the market. Weyland saw that neo-Populism was 
compatible, with its compatible nature being able to embrace two 
things at once. Neo-Populism on one hand cooperates with market 
mechanisms and the other side threatens the existence of regulation of 
private property rights (Weyland 1996; Weyland 1999) Although dif-
ferent, both of these main streams are equally in agreement with the 
333ISLAMIC POPULISM
conclusion that neo-populism still rests on “the call to the people”. It’s 
just that the manifestation of neo-Populism is seen differently.
Significantly different things actually come from Hadiz’s argument. 
For Hadiz, the evolution of populism in the midst of building neo-
liberalism is not enough to just stop at looking at the people alone. In 
countries with a major Muslim population such as the Middle East and 
Indonesia, the development of populism has cooperated with religion 
(Hadiz 2017; Heryanto & Hadiz 2005). People’s terminology that has 
been used to uncover populism is not enough to see the phenomenon 
of neo-Populism in the Middle East and Indonesia, as is the case in 
Latin America and Europe. More specifically, for Hadiz, neo-populism 
in the Middle East and specifically in Indonesia has partnered with 
Islam, so Hadiz offers the idea of neo-populism to become Islamic 
populism.
If populism uses the term “people”, Islamic populism the term 
“ummah” is preferred to replace the term “people”. Through Islamic 
Populism, there are efforts to initiate a movement by burning the spirit 
of the people through the labeling of the ummah. This labeling is in-
separable from the economic situation which increasingly marginalizes 
the “people” who incidentally in the context of Indonesia are mostly 
Muslim (Hadiz 2018). Ummah is used to gather support and mobilize 
economically-marginalized people in an asymmetrical, multi-class 
coallition (Hadiz 2018). This pattern is similar to the development of 
populism which took place in Latin America and Europe, as noted 
by Weyland that Populism was formed through a multi-class coalition 
(Weyland 1996). In Indonesia, Hadiz found the formation of a multi-
class coalition taking place between middle class, urban poor, and small 
bourgeoisie both in rural and urban areas.
THE A BSENCE OF PROGR ESSI V E POLITICS IN THE 
MIDST OF NEO -LIBER A LISM DEV ELOPMENT
Populism greatly benefitted from the absence of left-wing politics. 
The cold war that took place on the left hemisphere succeeded in 
reducing the influence of left-wing politics. For the context in Indone-
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sia, the impact of the cold war was the suppression of the PKI. Hadiz’s 
observations saw that the suppression of the PKI along with its political 
affiliation eliminated progressive politics on the political stage (Hadiz 
& Robison 2017). This situation posed a very significant impact on 
socio-political conditions. PKI as a political party has a very strong 
ideological cadre even to remote villages. Borowing Laclau’s terminol-
ogy, ideological nihilism grows along with the absence of class poli-
tics (Laclau 2006). This situation also took place after the cold war in 
Indonesia. After the disappearance of the PKI, there were hardly any 
political groups and organizations that appeared to echo the ideology 
and class-based politics as practiced by the PKI, thus automatically 
only separating two social groups, namely nationalist-secular groups 
and religious groups.
Then, the situation becomes more complicated in the absence of 
progressive politics along with the development of modernization and 
neo-liberalism which is market-centered. Market-oriented development 
was increasingly striking in the New Order regime. This process was 
quite effective because the New Order regime changed the nature of 
the state as a servant to capitalism, serving the interests of the devel-
opment of market orientation. In return, at the same time the coffers 
of development were centered and concentrated on the New Order 
Regime, which at that time was closely associated with Suharto. This 
situation further strengthened the New Order regime to consolidate its 
economic and political interests, which in turn further alienated the 
people from the economic center.
This momentum was ultimately used to ignite the political sprit 
of the Indonesian people. The rhetoric about economic injustice was 
brought up to the surface with religious narratives. This rhetoric aims 
to mobilize and gather greater masses, namely the people who are at 
once confirmed as the Ummah. Mobilization of the people in the name 
of religion is also widely sponsored by religious groups. Looking at this 
phase, after the abolition of progressive politics in Indonesia, only re-
ligious and secular nationalist groups remained. At that time, secular 
nationalist groups greatly benefitted from the development currently 
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taking place. This situation served as timely opportunity for religious 
groups that are increasingly isolated from to ignite the spirit and mobi-
lize ummah to fight back, especially with the growing number of Mus-
lim ummah bearing the title of educated people. This condition also 
put the issue of economic injustice alongside the electoral democratic 
process in Indonesia (Mietzner & Muhtadi 2018). As noted by Waynedt 
in Latin America and Europe, the strengthening of neo-Populism was 
thanks to an economic crisis compounded by the fragmentation of in-
stitutionalization and class-based political disappearances. Hadiz also 
noticed that the development of neo-liberalism kept out ummah from 
access to economic resources. Moreover, Hadiz believed that this in-
cident was aggravated by the chaotic organization of ummah and the 
fragmentation of parties claiming to be representatives of Muslims in 
the electoral process.
This situation rose to its climax when the New Order regime fell, 
which also marked a new chapter in the journey of democracy in In-
donesia. After the New Order, things did not change much. Islamic 
political instruments that had long been formed since the past only 
transformed to adapt to the ongoing social climate. That is to say that 
reform era has allowed Islamic populism to claim more space in the 
public sphere, allowing Islamic populism to flourish in Indonesia.
ISL A MIC POPULISM A ND THE FUTUR E 
OF ISL A MIC DEMOCR AC Y
Hadiz’s work that provides new theoretical insights in understanding 
the emergence of Islamic populism in Indonesia has greatly contributed 
to the body of populism-related knowledge. For Hadiz, the emergence 
of Islamic populism in Indonesia was formed from a long historical 
process, with quite complex political-economic upheavals, starting from 
the era of colonialism, which was then strengthened by the occurrence 
of the Cold War in the world. As a result of the cold war, domestic con-
flicts between the right wing and the left wing took place in Indonesia. 
The conflict continued with the removal of left-wing politics on the 
national political stage. Then, entering the year of 1997/1998, there was 
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an ongoing development of neo-liberalism with market patterns and the 
pressure of globalization that took place in Muslim countries, including 
Indonesia. The series of political-economic instability then made the 
progressive politics in Indonesia ceased to exist, and at the same time 
created a space for the strengthening of the influence of right-wing 
populism, including Islamic populism (Hadiz 2014).
For the future of democracy in Indonesia, at least, in certain con-
texts, Islamic Populism will still fill in the spaces in electoral democ-
racy. This has even been supporting by Hadiz and Robinson believing 
that the oligarchs will use Islamic populism to maintain and simultane-
ously expand oligarchies in Indonesia (Hadiz 2018; Hadiz & Robison 
2017).
This process is conducted through a democratic political strategy 
and accommodation of populist actors and voters. Through electoral 
democracy, oligarchs will focus oligarchic power on controlling the 
state. After conquering the state, it is easy for oligarchs to exercise con-
trol over their constituents, including populist actors and voters who 
pose a threat to oligarchs, by taking advantage from the available state 
apparatus. Furthermore, oligarch will take Islamic populism’s heart by 
gaining sympathy from groups and actors who have a great influence 
in directing the majority of Muslim voters in Indonesia One way is by 
establishing policies that are vaguely accommodating but patronage-
oriented (Aspinall 2015; Mietzner 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi 2018). 
This method is employed to get Islamic populism to support the oli-
garchy as part of self-perseverance.
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